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Abstract
Oswald's thesis posits that workers who own their own home should have longer
unemployment spells due to restricted mobility, but repeatedly the reverse is found.
We contribute to shed light on this puzzle in two key ways. First, we show that the
thesis holds when stated in terms of search intensity instead of unemployment. In
a job search model with moving costs we show that unemployed homeowners search
less than renters. We conﬁrm this result empirically using UK LFS data. Second,
we provide evidence that homeowners select search methods associated with shorter
unemployment spells, suggesting that they search more eﬃciently.
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1 Introduction
Although in the last decades the orientation of several governments, particularly in Europe,
has been to promote homeownership (Di Pasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Rohe et al., 2002; Dietz
& Haurin, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2010), economists have raised several concerns about the
consequences of large homeownership rates on the functioning of the labour market. The
analysis of the relation between the housing tenure and the labour market dates back to
mid nineties, when Andrew Oswald pinned on high homeownership rates the blame for the
high unemployment rates in Europe (Oswald, 1996, 1997, 1999). The receipt he proposed
to reduce unemployment was strikingly at odds with the prevailing political wisdom: We
can put Europe back to work . . . by reducing homeownership(Oswald, 1999). Several
studies using regional or cross-country data have later provided support to the claim that
high homeownership rates lead to high levels of unemployment rates (Blanchﬂower &
Oswald, 2013; Coulson & Fisher, 2009; Munch et al., 2006; Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2005;
Green & Hendershott, 2001a; Nickell & Layard, 1999; Nickell, 1998).
The most inﬂuential microeconomic interpretation of this ﬁnding has focused on the
supposedly lower job ﬁnding rates of unemployed people who own their own home. In
fact, since homeownership hampers the propensity to move for job reasons, homeowners
should experience longer unemployment spells than otherwise comparable renters. While
there is abundant evidence supporting the ﬁrst element of this rationale (Van den Berg
& Van Vuuren, 1998; Henley, 1998; Munch et al., 2006; Van Vuuren, 2009; Battu et al.,
2008), several empirical studies have found no support for the second, and in most cases
even the opposite (Goss & Phillips, 1997; Coulson & Fisher, 2002; Flatau et al., 2003;
Munch et al., 2006; Van Vuuren, 2009; Battu et al., 2008).1
Recently, Blanchﬂower & Oswald (2013) and Laamanen (2013) have reinforced the
argument against high homeownership rates assessing the role of possible negative ex-
ternalities. Their argument is not that homeowners themselves are disproportionately
unemployed (actually they ﬁnd further evidence against that), rather that the positive
relation between homeownership and unemployment rates can be explained by negative
externalities that the housing market can produce upon the labour market.2
The existing literature has investigated some possible explanations for the repeated
failure of Oswald's hypothesis in micro data. One explanation looks at the dichotomy
between the local and non-local labour markets in studying the eﬀect of moving costs.
Munch et al. (2006) point out that the lower mobility of owner-occupiers does not nec-
essarily imply that they have lower exit rates from unemployment. In fact, homeowners
should have higher reservation wages for jobs which require a residential move, but also
lower reservation wages for jobs which do not. Therefore, whether or not homeowners ﬁnd
jobs overall less quickly should be an empirical matter. However, this theoretical argument
does not suggest reasons why the counter-Oswald result could emerge in practice. More-
over, Van Vuuren (2009) has shown that whenever the homeownership choice is explicitly
modeled in the model of Munch et al. (2006), the hazard rate out of unemployment is
always lower for homeowners.3
1See Havet & Penot (2010) for a comprehensive survey of the literature analyzing the impact of housing
tenure on labour market outcomes, both at micro and macro level.
2They ﬁnd evidence of externalities related to lower levels of labour mobility, greater commuting times,
lower rates of business formation (Blanchﬂower & Oswald, 2013), consumption reductions and increased
local job competition caused by home purchases, especially if ﬁnanced by debt (Laamanen, 2013).
3In the model of Van Vuuren (2009), the eﬀect of homeownership is still ambiguous in the special case
that homeowners can receive unemployment beneﬁts only for a ﬁxed period while renters never run out
of it.
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Another explanation has focused on the importance of making distinctions among
categories of homeowners and among categories of renters. Among owners, one should
take into account that a commitment to mortgage payments can counteract the eﬀect of
the restricted mobility of owning a home. In general, committed housing expenditures
such as the rent and, especially, the mortgage should boost exit rates oﬀ unemployment
through higher pressure to return to work (Rouwendal & Nijkamp, 2010; Arulampalam
et al., 2000). This argument is used in the literature to explain why mortgage-holders have
typically the best outcomes (Brunet et al., 2007; Goss & Phillips, 1997; Flatau et al., 2003;
Kantor et al., 2013). Also, social and private renters may not behave the same way, since
social renters face lock-in eﬀects similarly to homeowners, due to below-market rent, long
waiting lists, security of tenure, and restricted transferability within social housing (Hughes
& McCormick, 1981, 1987, 2000; McCormick, 1983; Battu et al., 2008; Flatau et al.,
2003).4 The straight comparison between owners and non-owners could be misleading as
mortgagers share some similarities with private renters, and outright owners share some
with social renters. For the main mechanism underlying Oswald's hypothesis to emerge,
the relevant comparison should be made between outright owners and private renters. In
fact, outright owners do not have housing costs to cope with, so the mobility mechanism
is free from contrasting eﬀects, and private renters do not have same mobility constraints
as social renters. However, pieces of evidence on the comparison between outright owners
and private renters are in general ambiguous (Flatau et al., 2003; Brunet et al., 2007;
Battu et al., 2008), providing again scant support to Oswald's thesis. Moreover the use of
a multinomial speciﬁcation makes it more complicated to control for the likely endogeneity
of housing tenure. Though the relevance of the endogeneity issue (Green & Hendershott,
2001b; Brunet & Lesueur, 2009; Flatau et al., 2003; Van Leuvensteijn & Koning, 2004;
Munch et al., 2006; Brunet et al., 2007; Van Vuuren, 2009; Battu et al., 2008; Coulson &
Fisher, 2009) and of a more reﬁned deﬁnition of housing tenure is often stressed in the
literature, only seldom are these issues tackled jointly.5
Despite this large body of research, the mechanisms yielding more rapid exits from
unemployment to less mobile homeowners are not fully understood yet. In this paper,
taking into account current explanations, we investigate a novel approach to solve Oswald's
puzzle. The solution we propose has two key ingredients. The ﬁrst ingredient consists in
showing that Oswald's hypothesis holds when stated in term of search intensity instead of
unemployment. The second ingredient consists in exploring one possible reason why this
hypothesis does not work for unemployment.
The standard test of Oswald's hypothesis consists in estimating the eﬀect of housing
tenure on hazards out of unemployment.6 Our ﬁrst contribution is based on the consid-
eration that unemployment may be a misleading outcome to test the impact of housing
tenure, at least according to the channel discussed in the literature. The microeconomics
4In the UK, social housing is a form of housing tenure in which the property is owned by Local
Authorities or by Housing Associations, usually with the aim of providing accommodation at below-
market rent or even rent-free.
5Brunet et al. (2007) is the only study we are aware of that simultaneously controls for endogeneity and
for multinomial housing tenure, where adequate distinctions among homeowners and among renters are
made. Also Flatau et al. (2003) estimate a duration model with multinomial housing tenure correcting for
endogeneity and even for sample selection bias. However they use a two step approach à la RiversVuong
(Rivers & Vuong, 1988), and use age dummies as instruments, which is a questionable device. Moreover,
they report only estimates when housing tenure is not instrumented, since the hypothesis of exogeneity
cannot be rejected.
6Oswald's hypothesis has also been explored, though to a less extent, by looking at the eﬀect of
homeownership on the probability of being unemployed, on the risk of becoming unemployed, and on
wages (Havet & Penot, 2010). The Oswald's hypothesis is typically rejected even in these cases.
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of Oswald's argument suggests that higher mobility costs reduce the expected proﬁts of
a job search, and increase the reservation wage, for jobs which require relocation. While
this eﬀect translates in a given diﬀerence in reservation wages and in the levels of search
intensity between owners and non-owners, diﬀerences in unemployment outcomes could
be biased by other channels. For example, homeowners may be simply more eﬃcient in
the search process. Also, employers may prefer to hire workers who own their own accom-
modation since their expected job tenure is longer. In these cases, homeowners may be
able to exit unemployment more rapidly than renters even with the same or lower level of
search intensity.
The demonstration of our ﬁrst proposition is conducted by performing a theoretical
and empirical analysis. Firstly, we develop a model of endogenous job search eﬀort with
two labour markets which diﬀer geographically as in Munch et al. (2006). In the baseline
model with exogenous search eﬀort, the assumption of higher mobility costs entails the
main result that homeowners have lower job ﬁnding rates far from home but higher job
ﬁnding rates locally. However, the impact on the job ﬁnding rate as a whole remains
undetermined. By treating search eﬀort as endogenous, we will show that lower mobility
costs imply renters to have unambiguously higher overall search intensity and job ﬁnding
rate. Secondly, making use of a data set drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey, we
test empirically the main theoretical proposition by estimating the eﬀect of housing tenure
in a search intensity equation. In line with a wealth of empirical studies, the job search
eﬀort is proxied with the number of search methods used (Holzer, 1988; Blau & Robins,
1990; Wadsworth, 1991; Schmitt & Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg & Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim
& Taylor, 2001; Addison & Portugal, 2002; Weber & Mahringer, 2008; Manning, 2009;
Bachmann & Baumgarten, 2012). The use of job search methods is a well researched issue
in many countries. No one, however, has yet tested Oswald's hypothesis by this means.
Also, our study departs from most of those which attempt to control for the endogeneity
of housing tenure by adopting a multinomial speciﬁcation. We employ a multinomial
treatment eﬀects estimation which accounts for endogeneity of multiple treatments (Deb
& Trivedi, 2006b,a). Identiﬁcation is achieved by using a set of instrumental variables in
a housing tenure selection model that are excluded from the main search equation. The
results show that outright owners search less than private renters by around 11%, which
is exactly what one would expect according to Oswald's argument. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that mortgage-holders have the highest search intensity, and that social renters search
signiﬁcantly less than private renters.
The ﬁnding that (outright) homeowners search less intensively than (private) renters,
taken together with the repeated result that the former have shorter unemployment spells,
leads us to our second contribution. We explore whether homeowners' shorter unemploy-
ment duration can be explained by higher eﬃciency in the search process. The inves-
tigation of this insight is conducted empirically by estimating two models. On the one
side, a multinomial logit model is estimated to identify the eﬀect of housing tenure on the
selection of the main search method. On the other side, we estimate a competing-risks
unemployment duration model, with employment and inactivity as competing risks, to
identify search methods with shorter hazards to job. We distinguish six main methods of
job search: public employment centres (PEC), private employment agency, newspaper ad-
vertisements, employer contact, asking friends and relatives, and other. PEC are typically
observed to be ineﬀective for unemployed and their use has often been criticized (Holzer,
1988; Blau & Robins, 1990; Addison & Portugal, 2002; Longhi & Taylor, 2011). We ﬁnd
that private renters are signiﬁcantly more likely to rely on PEC as main search channel
relative to outright owners, while outright owners are relatively more likely to use newspa-
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pers advertisements. Estimates of the competing risks model suggest that PEC relatively
lengthens the time needed to reenter employment. Also, counter-Oswald evidence emerges
again in these estimates since outright owners are found to become employed more quickly
than private renters. Taken jointly, these ﬁndings provide some support to the idea that
outright owners select search methods which are more eﬀective for ﬁnding a job, which in
turn can explain why they return to job faster despite lower search intensity.
This paper has the following structure. In the next section, we present the theoret-
ical model of search. In Sections 3 we describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
In Section 4, we describe the econometric methodology employed to conduct the analy-
sis of search intensity (Sections 4.1) and the analysis of search methods (Sections 4.2).
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 provide the results for the two empirical analyses. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a simpliﬁed model of job search with endogenous search eﬀort
and exogenous wage oﬀer distribution.7 The eﬀect of homeownership is captured by allow-
ing for two distinct labour markets which diﬀer geographically as in Munch et al. (2006).
The local labour market is deﬁned as the region in which a worker can take a job without
moving. Symmetrically, jobs in the non-local labour market require a move.8 This frame-
work captures the idea that there exist two distinct reservation wages, one for the local
labour market and one for jobs outside, which will diverge when moving entails a cost.
The eﬀect of owning owns home is captured by assuming larger relocation costs. In case
of exogenous search eﬀort, the main result of the model is that homeowners have lower
job ﬁnding rates far from home but higher job ﬁnding rates in the local labour market
(Munch et al., 2006). However, the eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate as a whole is ambiguous.
Treating search eﬀort as endogenous will allow us to state propositions in terms of search
and to overcome this ambiguity.
The lifetime utility of the employed is kept as simple as possible, with zero separation
rate and no on-the-job search:
V E(w) =
w
ρ
, (1)
where w is the wage and ρ is the discount rate.
The unemployed can increase the job oﬀer arrival rate through search eﬀort at the cost
of a utility loss Cs. With two labour markets, the model has two distinct cost functions
and job oﬀer arrival rates, which diﬀer uniquely for the search eﬀort exerted in each of
them, namely sl and sn. We assume that the total cost of search is an additive function
in the two separate cost functions, i.e., Cs = c(sl) + c(sn), where c
′ > 0 and c′′ > 0.9 The
arrival rate of job oﬀers in the local and non-local labour markets are, respectively, α(sl)
and α(sn), where α
′ > 0 and α′′ < 0. Wage oﬀers are sampled from the c.d.f. F (w) which
we assume is the same for both markets.
When choosing how to allocate search eﬀort between the two labour markets, the
unemployed must take into account the cost of moving, that is, the cost incurred if ﬁnding
7See Mortensen (1986) for the background of search modeling and Manning (2009) for a similar version.
8Commuting is not allowed for, so workers accepting a job oﬀer in the non-local market necessarily
have to move and to pay the cost. See Kantor et al. (2013) for a model with commuting.
9The assumptions on c yield a standard convex total cost of search function. The model may be
enriched by allowing higher costs of search in the non-local labour market, but this is not relevant for the
comparison between the search behaviour of homeowners and renters.
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and accepting a job in the other region. The diﬀerence in this cost for homeowners and
renters is precisely what captures Oswald's eﬀect in the model. For simplicity, we set this
cost to zero for renters since it just needs to be higher for homeowners (Munch et al.,
2006). The value equation for the unemployed renter is
ρV U = b− c(sl)− c(sn) + (α(sl) + α(sn))
∫
w∗r
(V E(w)− V U) dF (w), (2)
where w∗r is the reservation wage for the renter and b is the unemployment beneﬁt.
The unemployed sets simultaneously the reservation wage and the search eﬀort levels
in order to maximise lifetime utility. As the renter is indiﬀerent between accepting a local
or a non-local job because moving is costless, so the reservation wage is the same for both.
Given risk neutrality, the reservation wage will satisfy w∗r = ρV
U . Replacing this and
Equation (1) in Equation (2), and rearranging, we have
w∗r = b− c(sl)− c(sn) +
(α(sl) + α(sn))
ρ
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r) dF (w). (3)
Diﬀerentiating Equation (3) with respect to sl and sn we get the ﬁrst order conditions for
the maximum,
c′(s∗l ) = α
′(s∗l )A, (4)
c′(s∗n) = α
′(s∗n)A, (5)
where we put A = ρ−1
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r) dF (w). It is easy to show that the unemployed renter
will exert the same search eﬀort in both markets. In fact, from Equations (4) and (5), we
get c′(s∗l )/α
′(s∗l ) = c
′(s∗n)/α
′(s∗n), which is true only when s
∗
l = s
∗
n. In this simple setup,
with no additional costs of search far from home and no costs of moving, the renter is
indiﬀerent between searching locally and in a distant area.
If the unemployed is a homeowner, the cost m which incurred if accepting a job in the
non-local labour market has to be considered.10 The discounted lifetime utility for the
unemployed homeowner is
ρV˜ U = b−c(sl)−c(sn)+α(sl)
∫
w∗l
(
w
ρ
− V˜ U
)
dF (w)+α(sn)
∫
w∗n
(
w
ρ
− V˜ U −m
)
dF (w),
(6)
where we have already replaced V E(w) = w/ρ. Now, we have two distinct levels of the
reservation wage, one for each of the two markets. The reservation wage for the local
labour market is w∗l = ρV˜
U , while the reservation wage for job oﬀers outside the local
labour market is w∗n = ρV˜
U + ρm: to accept a job oﬀer which requires a move, the
unemployed homeowner needs compensation for the cost of moving. Equation (6) can be
rewritten as
w∗l = b−c(sl)−c(sn)+
α(sl)
ρ
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l ) dF (w)+
α(sn)
ρ
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗l − ρm) dF (w). (7)
The optimal search levels in the two markets are determined by the ﬁrst order conditions
c′(s∗l ) = α
′(s∗l )B, (8)
10The cost of moving will be the same whether the homeowner moves to another owner-occupied housing
or to a rental accommodation, hence, this model captures only the lower mobility due to the cost of selling
a home. We may enrich the model by diﬀerentiating between moves to a rental and to an owner-occupied
accommodation (with higher costs for the latter), but this higher complexity will not yield higher beneﬁts
for our purposes.
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c′(s∗n) = α
′(s∗n)C, (9)
where we set B = ρ−1
∫
w∗l
(w−w∗l ) dF (w) and C = ρ−1
∫
w∗n
(w−w∗n) dF (w). Since w∗l < w∗n,
B > C holds for any w. From Equations (8) and (9), B > C implies c′(s∗l )/α
′(s∗l ) >
c′(s∗n)/α
′(s∗n). Given that c is convex and α is concave, the latter inequality implies s
∗
l > s
∗
n.
Unlike the renter, for the homeowner it is optimal to search harder in the local labour
market than outside.
Up to this point we have shown that the renter chooses the same level of search in both
markets, which we notate as s∗r, while the homeowner sets s
∗
l > s
∗
n. To identify the eﬀect
of housing tenure we now compare the search eﬀort of the renter and of the homeowner
in both markets. A ﬁrst result is stated in the following proposition (see Appendix C for
the proof).
Proposition 1 s∗l > s
∗
r > s
∗
n.
The rationale of this proposition is straightforward. When an unemployed person has
to face a cost of moving to accept a job oﬀer far from home, there is less searching outside,
and the search eﬀort is centred on the local area in order to reduce the probability of
incurring this cost.11 Whether or not the homeowner searches in general less than the
renter depends on the balance of these two opposite eﬀects, whose net result can be
identiﬁed within this framework. Before tackling this point, we will ﬁnd the relations
between the reservation wages of homeowners and renters in both markets, which is the
counterpart of Proposition 1. This is stated in the following proposition (see Appendix C
for the proof).
Proposition 2 w∗l < w
∗
r < w
∗
n.
In order to compare the total search level of the homeowner and the renter, that is,
the impact of housing tenure on search, we just have to compare the sum of the search
levels in the two markets. The search level of the homeowner will be greater than, equal
to, or lower than that of the renter depending on whether s∗l + s
∗
n R 2s∗r. The only thing
which diﬀerentiates the homeowner from the renter is the moving cost, so we may expect
that an increase of the moving cost from zero to a positive number, which represents just
a shift from renting to owner tenure, comes with a reduction of the total search eﬀort.
The rationale is that, although this cost is incurred only if the homeowner actually moves,
it increases the expected cost of the search, which in turn makes unemployment more
valuable. Thus, despite the incentive to search harder locally, this expected cost has to be
covered by an extra reduction in the non-local search (from s∗r to s
∗
n) compared to what
would be needed to compensate for the increase in the local search (from s∗r to s
∗
l ). The
following proposition conﬁrms this insight (see Appendix C for the proof).
Proposition 3 2s∗r > s
∗
l + s
∗
n.
Unlike the model of Munch et al. (2006), but like that of Van Vuuren (2009), we can
make clear predictions also on the whole job ﬁnding rates of the homeowner and the renter.
Van Vuuren (2009) generalizes the model of Munch et al. (2006) by introducing the choice
of homeownership. In his model, the employed can become homeowners, sustaining a ﬁxed
11Commuting would be another mechanism which implies that homeowners may search locally more
than renters. Given the higher costs of moving, homeowners would be willing to commute longer so that
their local labour market would be larger (Munch et al., 2006). The theoretical results would be simply
exacerbated if we allowed for commuting in this set-up, but the main message would not be qualitatively
aﬀected.
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cost for buying a home. It turns out that for a positive value of this cost, the hazard out
of unemployment is unambiguously lower for homeowners.
The renter's job ﬁnding rate is two times hr = α(s
∗
r) [1− F (w∗r)], which is the common
job ﬁnding rate for both markets, while the owner's job ﬁnding rate is the sum of hl =
α(s∗l ) [1− F (w∗l )] and hn = α(s∗n) [1− F (w∗n)], which refer respectively to the local and
to the non-local market. In order to compare job ﬁnding rates, we ﬁrst point out that,
by Propositions 1 and 2, hl > hr > hn. Thus, the unemployed living in owner-occupied
accommodations are expected to have a higher exit rate from unemployment towards jobs
which require a move, but a lower exit rate towards employment in the local labour market.
The main mechanism of Oswald's hypothesis works in this setup, since homeownership,
by hampering residential mobility, reduces the chances of ﬁnding an acceptable job far
from home. Can we also state that renters have higher exit rates than homeowners in
general? This is the case if 2hr > hl + hn, which again can be shown to be true within
this framework. The logic of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 and relies on its
results (see Appendix C for the proof).
Proposition 4 2α(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)] > α(s∗l ) [1− F (w∗l )] + α(s∗n) [1− F (w∗n)].
To conclude, this theoretical section delivers a clear message: due to larger mobility
costs, homeowners have lower levels of search eﬀort and lower exit rates from unemploy-
ment than renters. This means that the local versus non-local search explanation cannot
falsify the argument underlying Oswald's hypothesis. In the empirical section we will
provide evidence for the comparison of the search intensity between unemployed home-
owners and renters. Since the main argument of Oswald's hypothesis concerns the eﬀect
of mobility costs, the relevant comparison will be between outright owners and private
renters.
3 The Data
We use a data set drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly nationwide
survey which collects address-based interviews of about 60,000 households for each quar-
ter. Each individual is interviewed in ﬁve consecutive quarters on a rotating panel basis.
The sample we use spans the period 19992009, so that we have 44 calendar quarters of
observations.
The LFS provides a rich set of information on job search methods. In particular,
unemployed people who state that they have been looking for work in the last four weeks
are asked to reply which speciﬁc search methods they used, out of a total of 14. The count
of methods used is our measure of search intensity. Individuals are also asked to report
the main method of search used. The list of search methods is given in Appendix B.
For consistency with our research design, we restrict to a sub-sample of ILO unemployed
male heads of households (aged 1664) and we make some further sample adjustments.12
We drop observations for people who have never had a paid job, receive a retirement or
old age pension, are searching for work only as self-employed13, or are waiting to take up a
job already obtained. Proxy responses are also dropped. See Table 1 for sample statistics
on variables used in estimation.
12ILO unemployed are people without a job who have been looking for work in the last four weeks and
are available to start a new job within the following two weeks.
13We drop a small number of workers who search for work only as self-employed, since in this case, the
maximum number of methods is lower than for those who search only as employee. The search intensity
would be approximated with a diﬀerent scale of magnitude.
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We focus only on heads of households because we analyse the eﬀect on individual labour
outcomes of an individual tenure choice. For this purpose, we need individuals for whom
the residential status is actually the outcome of an individual choice, which is typically the
case for people responsible for the accommodation.14 For some non-heads of households, it
may be misleading to seek for a causal link from housing tenure to labour market behaviour
given that the former may not reﬂect the outcome of an individual choice.15 For example,
a young person still living in the family home and dependent on their parents in an owner-
occupied accommodation can hardly have a labour market behaviour assimilable to the
typical homeowner.
For the analysis of job search methods we focus on the main method of search reported
by the unemployed. We group main methods in six categories (see Appendix B). In order
to perform an unemployment duration analysis by means of the LFS, we use a survey
variable reporting the minimum of the length of time since the start of job search and
the last job.16 Durations are grouped in 8 time intervals: 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12
months, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, 5 years or more. We use as measure of
the spell length the value reported in the last interview associated with the unemployed
status before a switch. The status in which the spell ends up may be either employment or
inactivity, or may be unemployment when the interview is the last, that is the spell is right
censored. Regressors are assumed spell constant and their values refer to the last interview
before the exit (or the last interview for censored spells). We focus on a sub-sample with
stable housing tenure data over the spell. In particular, we drop spells for individuals who
switch housing tenure in the quarter either immediately preceding or following that in
which the spells ends. We come up with 11,374 spells of which 3,579 end in employment,
1,769 end in inactivity and 6,026 are right censored.
4 Methodology
4.1 Job search intensity
As a test of the theory outlined in Section 2, we aim at estimating the eﬀect of housing
tenure on search intensity. The theoretical model predicts, in agreement with Oswald's
hypothesis, that the higher mobility costs implied by homeownership reduce the optimal
search intensity. For that mechanism to emerge, one should compare outright owners
with private renters in the empirical analysis, as discussed in Section 1. An equation
of search intensity is estimated, plugging in on the right hand side a set of dummies
for residential status, namely own_out, own_mort, and rent_soc, where rent_pri is the
baseline category. The dependent variable nummet is the count of search methods used,
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 14. Other measures of search eﬀort have been used
in the literature, such as the time spent for search in a given time interval, the number
of employer contacts, or a combination of diﬀerent measures (Green et al., 2011). The
number of search methods may be an imperfect measure of search intensity as it cannot
quantify the eﬀort the individual dedicates to each method. Despite this criticism, evidence
suggests that this variable can capture relevant dimensions of search intensity. In fact,
14The LFS uses this deﬁnition of head of household: Head of household (HOH) is deﬁned as either the
man or the husband/male partner of the woman in whose name the accommodation was owned or rented.
Where two people have equal claim, either the oldest male is selected or, in all female households, the
oldest female.
15Neither might the residential status of some heads of households be an individual choice, but this
issue can be handled using controls at the household level in the empirical analysis.
16This is the LFS durun variable.
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it is typically found to be strongly associated to the probability of gaining job (Holzer,
1988; Gregg & Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim & Taylor, 2001), notably in UK data (Gregg &
Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim & Taylor, 2001), and to be related to other variables coherently
with theory (Holzer, 1988; Blau & Robins, 1990; Schmitt & Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg &
Wadsworth, 1996; Addison & Portugal, 2002; Weber & Mahringer, 2008; Bachmann &
Baumgarten, 2012).
When trying to identify the eﬀect of housing tenure on search intensity, one should
take into account that selection into housing tenure can be aﬀected by unobserved factors
that are likely to be related to labour market outcomes. For example, less mobile people
as well as people with a greater desire to retain proximity to family members or friends
may self-select into homeownership, and restricted mobility is expected to be associated
with low search intensity. We hence adopt a structural estimation method which takes
into account that housing tenure and search intensity are jointly determined. Speciﬁcally,
we employ the endogenous multinomial treatment eﬀect method developed by Deb and
Trivedi (Deb & Trivedi, 2006b,a).17 This turns out to be the most suitable method we are
aware of for our case, given the multinomial speciﬁcation of the endogenous variable.18
The model speciﬁcation comprises a set of equations that model the generating pro-
cess of the treatment variables, i.e. residential states, and an outcome equation with a
structural-causal interpretation. Each individual i chooses a residential status j from a set
of four choices (j = 0, 1, 2, 3), where j = 0 is the control group (private renters). Let dj be
binary selection variables representing the observed tenure choice and di = (di1, di2, di3).
Also let li = (li1, li2, li3), where lij are latent factors which incorporate unobserved char-
acteristics common to individual i 's status choice and outcome. Then the probability
function for the tenure choice is modeled by a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) struc-
ture:
P (di|zi, li) = exp(z
′
iαj + δjlij)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(z
′
iαk + δklik)
, (10)
where zi denotes a set of exogenous regressors and J = 3. The equation for the expected
count outcome is
E(yi|di,xi, li) = exp(x′iβ +
J∑
j=1
γjdij +
J∑
j=1
λjlij), (11)
where xi is a set of exogenous variables within zi and the γj-s are the treatment coeﬃcients
relative to private renters. The distribution of yi is assumed to follow a negative binomial
process that can accommodate overdispersion of the count variable unlike the standard
Poisson. The data are overdispersed if the conditional variance exceeds the conditional
mean, which is the case in several applications. An indication of the magnitude of the
overdispersion can be obtained by simply comparing the sample mean and the variance.
In our estimation sample, the mean and variance of nummet are, respectively, 4.6 and 6.4
(see Table 1), which suggests the presence of overdispersion.
The estimation method relies on the speciﬁcation of a joint distribution for the outcome
and the endogenous treatment choice (see Appendix C for a formal and detailed repre-
sentation). Since the latent factors enter into the likelihood function but are unknown,
the maximization of the likelihood function is performed through simulation, by drawing
17The method is implemented using the Stata routine mtreatreg provided by the reference.
18See Trivedi & Munkin (2010) for a survey of recent developments in count models, in particular with
reference to endogenous categorical regressors.
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several random numbers from a standard normal distribution.19
In principle, the parameters of the structural model are identiﬁed through nonlinear
functional forms even if all variables in the outcome equation are included in the residential
status equations, i.e. xi = zi. However, for more robust identiﬁcation we use traditional
exclusion restrictions by specifying instrumental variables in the residential status choice
that are excluded from the search intensity equation (Deb & Trivedi, 2006b,a). Several
variables have been proposed in the literature to instrument housing tenure, or more
speciﬁcally homeownership. One prominent instrument, often used in the literature, is
the regional homeownership rate (Van Leuvensteijn & Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006;
Brunet & Lesueur, 2009). However this instrument has also been criticized for being
likely related to labour market aggregate outcomes, hence likely to impact on individual
performance (Coulson & Fisher, 2009; De Graaf & Van Leuvensteijn, 2007; De Graaf et al.,
2009).20 Other instruments used in the literature are the user cost of owning compared
to renting in the area (Flatau et al., 2002; Brunet & Lesueur, 2004, 2009; Barrios García
& Rodríguez Hernández, 2004), the father's job (Battu et al., 2008; Brunet et al., 2007),
the age at entry into the housing (Brunet et al., 2007), the average distance to jobs
(Brunet & Lesueur, 2004, 2009), the past residential status of parents (Van Leuvensteijn
& Koning, 2004), the homeowner rate in the city where the individual was born (Van
Leuvensteijn & Koning, 2004), age dummies (Flatau et al., 2003) and US states dummies
(Green & Hendershott, 2001b). Unfortunately these variables are often either based on
barely convincing arguments for exogeneity or rare in data. Coulson & Fisher (2009)
employ a careful application of IV techniques using a set of plausible instruments: the
percentage of households in the area living in multifamily housing, an indicator capturing
whether the two ﬁrst-born children in the household have the same sex, and the state
marginal tax rate as applied to the mortgage interest deduction. In our analysis, we
use a set of three instruments, borrowing from Coulson & Fisher (2009) the ﬁrst and
second instrument, and using the relative cost of owning with mortgage versus renting
as third instrument. Speciﬁcally we use these variables: log(multifamrate), samesex
and log(Cmort/Crent). These variables should be relevant to explaining the housing tenure
choice and should have no eﬀect on the search intensity once the eﬀect of the included
regressors is partialled out.
The variablemultifamrate indicates the percentage of households living in multifamily
housing for each region and quarter. House sharing among families is more common
in rented than in owner-occupied dwellings as a rent can be more easily shared than
an ownership or a mortgage. Hence multifamily households are more likely to live in
rentals while single-family households are more likely to live in owner-occupied dwellings.
It follows that the propensity for homeownership should be correlated to the share of
multifamily dwellings in the area (Coulson & Fisher, 2009).21
The instrument samesex has been originally designed by Angrist & Evans (1998) to
identify the causal eﬀect of fertility on labour supply. Since fertility decisions can be
endogenously determined with labour force participation, Angrist & Evans (1998) exploit
the preference of parents for siblings of diﬀerent sexes to instrument the number of children.
19Provided that the number of draws is suﬃciently large, maximization of the simulated log likelihood
is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood (Gourieroux et al., 1984). See Deb & Trivedi (2006b) and
Deb & Trivedi (2006a) for a discussion of the choice of the number of draws. We set the number of draws
to 2,000. Estimation with fewer draws gave very similar results.
20Di Pasquale & Glaeser (1999) proposed a modiﬁcation of this, stratifying the local homeownership
rate by race and income quantile.
21Coulson & Fisher (2009) point out that multifamily housing could be endogenous at the individual
level.
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They ﬁnd that the number of children does not have any eﬀect on male labour outcomes.
Considering that the presence of children is correlated with the propensity to become
owners, Coulson & Fisher (2009) use the sex of children in the household as an instrument
for homeownership in a male unemployment binary equation. We replicate this instrument
using the dummy samesex, which indicates whether the two ﬁrst-born children in the
household are the same sex. In our estimation sample, households for whom the two
ﬁrst-born children are the same sex are 3.7% more likely to have more kids.22 Moreover,
households with two children are 16.2% more likely to be homeowners than households
with more than two children.
The third instrument is the ratio between mortgage costs and rental costs and varies
over years and quarters. These data are drawn from the UK Family Resource Survey
(FRS) since information on housing costs is not present in the LFS (see Appendix B for
details). The higher the cost of holding a mortgage on owns home relative to the market
rent in the area, the lower should be the propensity of occupying home with a mortgage
rather than rent. While we expect this variable is capturing the impact on tenure choice
for owning with mortgage over renting, this could have in principle also a negative impact
on owning outright as this state can be achieved once the loan is paid oﬀ.
4.2 Job search methods
The choice of the amount of eﬀort to spend on search aﬀects the job ﬁnding rate by en-
hancing the probability of receiving a job oﬀer. However this probability can be inﬂuenced
by the way this eﬀort is allocated as well. For example, homeowners may select search
channels that ease the matching to employers, for a given total eﬀort used. We investigate
this issue by estimating two models. First, we estimate a multinomial logit that models
the selection process of the main search method. We use six categories as possible choices:
public employment centres (PEC), private employment agency, newspaper advertisements,
employer contact, asking friends and relatives, and other. For each individual we consider
the main method of search reported, and we include nummet as control variable. The
housing tenure dummies are included as regressors to identify the probability of selecting
a speciﬁc method for each status.
Second we perform an unemployment duration analysis to identify search methods that
are associated with faster job ﬁnding, controlling for the total number of methods. We
estimate a competing risks model with two possible risks, namely exits into employment
and exits into inactivity. The duration variable is drawn from a speciﬁc question which
groups answers in discrete intervals. The likelihood of exiting to a speciﬁc state is modeled
by a multinomial logit, using data expanded into person-period form and trimesters as time
unit (Allison, 1982). This allows for unobserved factors aﬀecting each destination-speciﬁc
hazard.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Job search intensity
Table 2 shows estimates of diﬀerent models for nummet. We ﬁrst report OLS results to
provide a baseline estimate. Using log(nummet) as dependent variable, OLS estimates
suggest that, relative to private renters, outright owners search less by 5.7%, social renters
22As compared to 7% in Angrist & Evans (1998) and 6% in Coulson & Fisher (2009), who make diﬀerent
sample restrictions.
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search less by 6.6%, and mortgagers search more by 7.5%. However, these results do
not take into consideration the count dimension of the dependent variable, either overdis-
persion or endogeneity of housing tenure. The exogenous NB model deals with the ﬁrst
two issues. In the second column, the overdispersion test of δ conﬁrms the presence of
a signiﬁcant amount of overdispersion, supporting the use of a NB speciﬁcation instead
of a Poisson. Estimates under the exogeneity assumption incorporate both the causal
eﬀect and the selection eﬀect. In the third column, we report NB estimates that take
into account endogeneity of housing tenure. The housing tenure coeﬃcients are strongly
signiﬁcant. Owning owns home outright implies (exp(−0.1163)− 1) · 100 = −11.0% lower
search intensity than private renting. This large exogenous diﬀerence in search intensity
between outright owners and private renters is precisely what Oswald's thesis calls for.
Moreover, mortgagers have (exp(0.1232) − 1) · 100 = 13.1% higher search intensity than
private renters, while social renters search less by (approximately) 4.7%.23
The coeﬃcients of the latent factors λj capture the eﬀect on the search intensity of the
unobserved characteristics related to housing tenure. In particular, a positive (negative)
λj means that the latent factors which increase the relative probability of selecting the j-th
residential status have a positive (negative) impact on the search intensity. Estimates point
to positive selection in unobservables for outright ownership and social renting, and point
to negative selection for ownership with mortgage. Consistently, β-s in the endogenous
NB are smaller for the former states and larger for the latter. A simple likelihood ratio
(LR) test for exogeneity of housing tenure can be constructed under the null hypothesis
that the λ-s are jointly equal to zero, i.e., λown_out = λown_mort = λrent_soc = 0.
24 The LR
statistic suggests that exogeneity can be safely rejected.
The estimated eﬀects of the other regressors are generally consistent with standard
economic interpretation and with earlier empirical evidence using the count of methods
as proxy for search intensity (Holzer, 1988; Blau & Robins, 1990; Schmitt & Wadsworth,
1993; Gregg & Wadsworth, 1996; Addison & Portugal, 2002; Weber & Mahringer, 2008;
Bachmann & Baumgarten, 2012). Search intensity increases with education levels and
decreases with duration of unemployment since the last job. The age eﬀect is concave
and peaks at 3544, with the oldest workers (5564) searching signiﬁcantly less than the
youngest (1634). Married male heads of household search more than unmarried. Receipt
of disability beneﬁts disincentives search. However, search intensity is positively related
to the receipt of unemployment beneﬁt, indicating a spurious eﬀect. In fact, receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts in the UK is conditioned on compliance with relatively strict
search-related criteria, so that only job-seekers who exert a substantial amount of search
eﬀort are eligible (Manning, 2009; Petrongolo, 2009).25
The estimates of the MMNL for housing tenure, as showed in Table 3, are also consistent
with our expectations and earlier evidence (Battu et al., 2008; Van Leuvensteijn & Koning,
2004; Flatau et al., 2003, 2002; Brunet & Lesueur, 2009). In particular, the instruments are
signiﬁcant and have the expected signs. The LR test for joint signiﬁcance of instruments is
fairly large conﬁrming their relevance. In regions with larger share of multifamily dwellings,
individuals are more likely to select ownership status. Families with two ﬁrst-born children
of the same sex are more likely to occupy with rentals than owning outright. This diﬀerence
is particularly strong for social tenancy, with a signiﬁcantly larger likelihood than private
tenancy. Ownership with mortgage stands out as a peculiar case, with a positive and
23These coeﬃcients are estimates of γj in Equation (11). Since the conditional mean of nummet is
exponential, exponentiated coeﬃcients measure the factor increase in nummet for a switch in the status.
24The LR statistic is equal to q times the diﬀerence between the log-likelihoods of the endogenous and
exogenous models, and follows a χ2(q) distribution, where q = 3 is the number of λ parameters.
25Estimates hold very similar omitting the claimant regressor.
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signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Considering that samesex is capturing the eﬀect of the number
of children, this result points out that families with more kids tend to prefer ownership
with loan than outright, reaﬃrming the importance of distinguishing between ownership
states. The third instrument log(Cmort/Crent) impacts positively the likelihood of owning
with mortgage relative to tenancy. Supporting the relevance of these instruments is also the
fact that their coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant in each treatment equation. Unfortunately,
there is no formal test for the validity of exclusion restrictions in a nonlinear setting such
this (Deb & Trivedi, 2006b). However, as an informal check of exogeneity we estimated
the same model but including instrumental variables also in the outcome equation. Their
coeﬃcients turn out to be individually and jointly not signiﬁcant, which is quite a strong
result given the size of our sample and the signiﬁcance of the other coeﬃcients.26
5.2 Job search methods
In Figure 2 we report the distribution of the main method of search by housing tenure.
PEC and newspapers advertisements account for a large portion of the distribution and
there is a clear diﬀerence in their use between homeowners and renters. Homeowners rel-
atively prefer newspapers advertisements while renters relatively prefer PEC. In Table 4
we report estimates of the multinomial logit for the six main methods of search. Reported
coeﬃcients are Relative Risk Ratios (RRR).27 The RRR for outright owners and newspa-
pers advertisements is 1.380 suggesting that the ratio between the probability of selecting
newspapers advertisements and the probability of selecting PEC is 38% higher for out-
right owners than private renters. Out of these estimates we compute the conditional
probabilities of selecting each method by housing tenure, that are reported in Figure 3.
Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between outright owners and private renters are found
only for newspapers advertisements and for PEC, with outright owners preferring the
former and private renters preferring the latter.28
Concerning the eﬀectiveness of search methods, related studies have documented that
PEC are typically poorly eﬀective for unemployed and their use has often been criticized
(Holzer, 1988; Blau & Robins, 1990; Bishop & Abraham, 1993; Ports, 1993; Addison &
Portugal, 2002; Longhi & Taylor, 2011). Unemployed who do not rely mainly on PEC
are likely to be more proactive in their job search, therefore having enhanced chances to
ﬁnd a job (Longhi & Taylor, 2011). However, the PEC may be often approached when
alternative search channels are not available (Bachmann & Baumgarten, 2012), hence it
may be also possible that PEC is less eﬀective because used at the last resort (Green,
2011). The coeﬃcient of log(nummet) in Table 4 suggests actually that unemployed who
use more methods prefer any method to PEC as main one.
In Table 5 we report estimates of the competing risks model for the unemployed. First,
consistently with standard evidence, we notice that the probability of ﬁnding a job de-
creases as the time spent unemployed increases, and increases with the number of methods.
We ﬁnd also the typical result that homeowners have higher chance to escape unemploy-
ment for a job than renters. In particular, mortgagers have the best performance and
outright owners have 55.1% higher risk of ﬁnding job than private renters. In agreement
with previous evidence, we ﬁnd that, relatively to the use of PEC, four methods are as-
sociated with higher relative risk to ﬁnd a job, namely private employment agency, direct
26These results are made available by the author.
27The RRR for a pair outcome states (i1, i2) and a pair of residential states (j1, j2), is deﬁned as
RRRi1,i2,j1,j2 = (pi1,j1/pi2,j1)/(pi1,j2/pi2,j2), where pi,j = P (main = i|HT = j,X = X¯).
28Given the estimated probabilities, we obtain RRRnews,pec,out,pri =
(pnews,out/ppec,out)/(pnews,pri/ppec,pri) = (52.33/25.54)/(45.87/30.90) = 1.380.
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contact to employers, newspapers advertisements and other. The fact that using newspa-
pers advertisements shortens signiﬁcantly the unemployment duration relative to PEC is
somewhat interesting given that outright owners select signiﬁcantly more the former and
private renters select signiﬁcantly more the latter.
Taken jointly, these results suggest that outright owners, and homeowners in general,
tend to select search methods associated with shorter unemployment spells. The interpre-
tation of this ﬁnding can be related to a better position to identify more eﬀective channels
that homeowners can have locally. Certainly, homeowners can access more easily relevant
information and opportunities in the area they reside in, because they are more well-
established and can rely on a denser social network in local communities. This explains
why homeowners are less likely to use PEC (Osberg, 1993). On the contrary, individuals
with ﬂimsy ties with the local community should be less aware of or have limited access
to search channels other than the PEC (Bachmann & Baumgarten, 2012). In the end, it
may be possible that the spatial bias in search activities induced by mobility constraints,
with homeowners searching relatively more locally and renters relatively more non-locally,
is more beneﬁcial to owners.
6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the well-known argument that homeownership reduces exit
rates from unemployment by hampering residential mobility, known under the name of
Oswald's eﬀect. The empirical literature on this point has conﬁrmed that unemployed
homeowners are less prone than renters to move for job reasons, but has also found that
homeowners have typically shorter unemployment spells, as opposite to Oswald's hypoth-
esis. By taking into account the role of mobility constrains in the regional allocation of
job search, and a reﬁned deﬁnition of housing tenure, we have explored a novel solution to
this puzzle. First, by using the job search eﬀort of the unemployed as outcome of interest
instead of the unemployment duration, we have provided both theory and evidence in line
with Oswald's thesis. That is, outright owners have lower search intensity than private
renters. Second, by analyzing empirically the selection of search methods, we have inves-
tigated whether homeowners' lower search intensity and shorter unemployment spells can
be reconciled in terms of higher eﬃciency in the search process.
Regarding the ﬁrst contribution, we have shown that in a simple model of endogenous
search with moving costs, while homeowners search more intensively than renters for jobs
in the local area, they search less intensively in distant areas, so that their total search
level is unambiguously lower. Accordingly, our econometric analysis of the number of
search methods used has shown that outright owners search less intensively than private
renters, even after controlling for endogeneity of housing tenure. Moreover, estimates
corroborate the importance of using a multinomial deﬁnition of housing tenure. We ﬁnd
that mortgagers have the highest search, and that social renters search signiﬁcantly less
than private renters. This is in line with the intuition that mortgage-holders have larger
pressure to reenter employment than outright owners, and that social renters face lock-in
eﬀects hindering incentives to search relative to private renters. The take-home message
is that Oswald's thesis, in terms of search intensity, is strongly supported.
But still, why do owners search less intensively and have at the same time better
chances of escaping unemployment? We have pointed out that while mobility costs aﬀect
the choice of the level of search intensity in the ﬁrst place, as explained by Oswald's
argument, the length of the unemployment spell can depend on factors which are not
related to that argument but still are related to housing tenure. We have put forward
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one possible solution focusing on the eﬃciency of job search. The evidence we have come
up with shows that private renters rely more on public employment oﬃces and outright
owners rely more on newspapers advertisements, whereas the latter channel is associated
with relatively shorter unemployment spells. This leads us to conclude that outright
owners select more eﬀective search methods despite a lower overall amount of search.
Our argument is based on the insight that mobility constraints, by limiting the spatial
extension of the search process, may bring about a redistribution of search activities more
beneﬁcial to homeowners. Indeed, a stronger connection with the local social network can
put them in a better position to access relevant information and opportunities in the area.
Hence, comparative advantages in the local search may compensate for disproportionately
lower non-local search, resulting ultimately in shorter unemployment duration. This line
of reasoning can provide a solution to the puzzle of unemployment and housing tenure,
and can open the way for further investigation based on the search behaviour. Moreover,
while our focus has been on the unemployed's behaviour, other explanations could focus
on the employer's side. For example, employers' hiring strategies may be biased toward
homeowners, since residential stability can act as a signal of a higher propensity for long-
lasting labour relations. Investigation of this insight is left for future research.
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Table 1
Estimation sample statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
nummet 4.607 2.521 1 14 Greater Manchester 0.043 0.204 0 1
own_out 0.135 0.342 0 1 Merseyside 0.031 0.174 0 1
own_mort 0.263 0.440 0 1 Rest of North West 0.044 0.204 0 1
rent_soc 0.409 0.492 0 1 South Yorkshire 0.031 0.172 0 1
rent_pri 0.193 0.395 0 1 West Yorkshire 0.043 0.204 0 1
white 0.887 0.316 0 1 Rest York. & Humb. 0.032 0.176 0 1
married 0.388 0.487 0 1 East Midlands 0.067 0.250 0 1
claimant 0.555 0.497 0 1 West Midlands Metro 0.065 0.246 0 1
disabben 0.071 0.256 0 1 Rest of West Mids. 0.038 0.190 0 1
incsup 0.099 0.299 0 1 Eastern 0.073 0.260 0 1
age_16_34 0.284 0.451 0 1 Inner London 0.061 0.240 0 1
age_35_44 0.255 0.436 0 1 Outer London 0.063 0.243 0 1
age_45_54 0.253 0.435 0 1 South East 0.097 0.296 0 1
age_55_64 0.209 0.406 0 1 South West 0.061 0.240 0 1
degree 0.124 0.330 0 1 Wales 0.052 0.223 0 1
higher_educ 0.065 0.246 0 1 Strathclyde 0.057 0.233 0 1
gce 0.236 0.425 0 1 Rest of Scotland 0.054 0.227 0 1
gcse 0.189 0.391 0 1 Northern Ireland 0.021 0.144 0 1
other_qual 0.177 0.382 0 1 qrtr1 0.261 0.439 0 1
no_qual 0.209 0.407 0 1 qrtr2 0.251 0.434 0 1
managers & admins 0.114 0.318 0 1 qrtr3 0.246 0.430 0 1
professional 0.060 0.237 0 1 qrtr4 0.243 0.429 0 1
associate prof & tech. 0.068 0.252 0 1 year1999 0.124 0.329 0 1
clerical & secretarial 0.048 0.215 0 1 year2000 0.106 0.308 0 1
craft & related 0.153 0.360 0 1 year2001 0.097 0.296 0 1
plant & machine opers. 0.167 0.373 0 1 year2002 0.101 0.301 0 1
other occupations 0.285 0.451 0 1 year2003 0.092 0.289 0 1
0-3 months (last job) 0.185 0.388 0 1 year2004 0.073 0.260 0 1
3-6 months 0.146 0.353 0 1 year2005 0.075 0.264 0 1
6-12 months 0.165 0.371 0 1 year2006 0.077 0.267 0 1
1-2 years 0.168 0.374 0 1 year2007 0.074 0.263 0 1
2-3 years 0.077 0.266 0 1 year2008 0.077 0.267 0 1
3-4 years 0.049 0.215 0 1 year2009 0.105 0.306 0 1
4-5 years 0.036 0.187 0 1 multifamrate 0.059 0.024 0.025 0.167
5-8 years 0.069 0.253 0 1 Cmort 96.106 27.789 44.138 207.232
>8 years 0.105 0.307 0 1 Crent 86.207 26.377 50.747 185.016
Tyne & Wear 0.030 0.171 0 1 log(Cmort/Crent) 0.112 0.184 -0.615 0.512
Rest of North East 0.035 0.184 0 1 samesex 0.086 0.281 0 1
obs 26,005 obs 26,005
Notes: The sample is made of respondent male heads of households who are ILO unemployed. See Appendix B for description
of variables.
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Table 2
The effect of housing tenure on unemployed's search intensity
log-linear OLS NB  exogenous NB  endogenous
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
own_out -0.0567 ** (0.0147) -0.0617 ** (0.0121) -0.1163 ** (0.0144)
own_mort 0.0753 ** (0.0122) 0.0733 ** (0.0099) 0.1232 ** (0.0128)
rent_soc -0.0664 ** (0.0111) -0.0285 ** (0.0091) -0.0467 ** (0.0113)
white 0.0438 ** (0.0142) 0.0218 (0.0118) 0.0201 (0.0119)
married 0.0200 * (0.0089) 0.0199 ** (0.0073) 0.0121 (0.0075)
claimant 0.2812 ** (0.0085) 0.2316 ** (0.0072) 0.2324 ** (0.0072)
disabben -0.0817 ** (0.0169) -0.0741 ** (0.0153) -0.0742 ** (0.0154)
Age
age_35_44 0.0336 ** (0.0110) 0.0207 * (0.0089) 0.0153 (0.0090)
age_45_54 0.0110 (0.0115) 0.0055 (0.0094) 0.0035 (0.0095)
age_55_64 -0.0808 ** (0.0132) -0.0721 ** (0.0111) -0.0592 ** (0.0116)
Highest education
degree 0.2190 ** (0.0163) 0.2078 ** (0.0135) 0.2016 ** (0.0137)
higher_educ 0.2295 ** (0.0186) 0.2201 ** (0.0152) 0.2136 ** (0.0154)
gce 0.1963 ** (0.0125) 0.1884 ** (0.0106) 0.1834 ** (0.0107)
gcse 0.1567 ** (0.0130) 0.1484 ** (0.0109) 0.1455 ** (0.0109)
other_qual 0.1228 ** (0.0131) 0.1182 ** (0.0111) 0.1176 ** (0.0112)
Duration since last job
0− 3 months 0.2439 ** (0.0180) 0.2061 ** (0.0155) 0.1927 ** (0.0158)
3− 6 months 0.2477 ** (0.0182) 0.2111 ** (0.0157) 0.2027 ** (0.0159)
6− 12 months 0.2150 ** (0.0177) 0.1768 ** (0.0154) 0.1724 ** (0.0156)
1− 2 years 0.1792 ** (0.0175) 0.1495 ** (0.0153) 0.1486 ** (0.0154)
2− 3 years 0.1213 ** (0.0202) 0.0956 ** (0.0176) 0.0960 ** (0.0177)
3− 4 years 0.1143 ** (0.0233) 0.0984 ** (0.0202) 0.0995 ** (0.0203)
4− 5 years 0.0868 ** (0.0255) 0.0606 ** (0.0224) 0.0633 ** (0.0226)
5− 8 years 0.0479 * (0.0211) 0.0396 * (0.0188) 0.0422 * (0.0189)
occupation dummies X X X
region dummies X X X
quarter dummies X X X
year dummies X X X
δ 0.2209 ** (0.0103) 0.1834 ** (0.0126)
λown_out 0.0684 ** (0.0090)
λown_mort -0.0633 ** (0.0095)
λrent_soc 0.0244 ** (0.0084)
log-likelihood -84205.3 -84197.6
LR exogeneity ∼ χ2(2) 15.4 (p < 0.01)
obs 26,005 26,005 26,005
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable y is the count of search methods used. In the OLS
case, the logarithm of y is used so β-s are semi-elasticities. For the Negative Binomial (NB) models, β-s are coeﬃcients of the
linear index, whereas exponentiated β-s have the standard interpretation in terms of factor change. The variance function
used for the NB models is ω = µ(1 + δ), leading to the NB1 version. Positive δ implies overdispersion. Robust standard
errors are reported. The sample is made of respondent male heads of households who are ILO unemployed. Observations
are quarterly for the period 19992009. See Appendix B for the base categories of discrete regressors.
Endogeneity of housing tenure is accounted for estimating a multinomial endogenous treatment eﬀects model, where a NB
for y is estimated jointly with a mixed multinomial logit for the housing tenure choice (see Table 3). λ-s are loading factors
of the latent terms and positive (negative) λ indicates positive (negative) selection on unobservables. The LR test strongly
supports rejection of exogeneity.
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Table 3
The Housing Tenure ChoiceMultinomial Mixed Logit
own_out own_mort rent_soc
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
log(multifamrate) -0.748 * (0.323) -0.570 * (0.265) -0.314 (0.231)
samesex -0.381 ** (0.131) 0.203 * (0.091) 0.582 ** (0.081)
log(Cmort/Crent) -0.107 (0.278) -0.469 * (0.231) -0.135 (0.205)
white 0.451 ** (0.112) 0.407 ** (0.084) 0.051 (0.069)
married 1.236 ** (0.062) 1.561 ** (0.053) 0.094 (0.051)
claimant -0.641 ** (0.061) -0.405 ** (0.050) 0.513 ** (0.045)
disabben 0.101 (0.122) 0.371 ** (0.105) 0.699 ** (0.090)
Age
age_35_44 1.569 ** (0.114) 1.248 ** (0.063) 0.262 ** (0.053)
age_45_54 3.017 ** (0.109) 1.728 ** (0.067) 0.377 ** (0.059)
age_55_64 4.482 ** (0.114) 1.884 ** (0.082) 0.480 ** (0.074)
Highest education
degree 0.663 ** (0.113) 0.667 ** (0.096) -1.365 ** (0.092)
higher_educ 0.601 ** (0.130) 0.789 ** (0.113) -0.867 ** (0.105)
gce 0.375 ** (0.090) 0.574 ** (0.078) -0.573 ** (0.066)
gcse 0.180 (0.101) 0.409 ** (0.082) -0.268 ** (0.065)
other_qual -0.174 (0.101) -0.018 (0.085) -0.203 ** (0.064)
Duration since last job
0− 3 months 0.381 ** (0.132) 1.233 ** (0.114) -0.998 ** (0.090)
3− 6 months 0.632 ** (0.135) 1.069 ** (0.118) -0.759 ** (0.093)
6− 12 months 0.552 ** (0.130) 0.736 ** (0.116) -0.585 ** (0.089)
1− 2 years 0.375 ** (0.129) 0.323 ** (0.117) -0.476 ** (0.086)
2− 3 years 0.157 (0.149) 0.083 (0.136) -0.402 ** (0.100)
3− 4 years 0.223 (0.165) -0.026 (0.148) -0.458 ** (0.114)
4− 5 years 0.089 (0.175) -0.308 (0.168) -0.416 ** (0.124)
5− 8 years -0.174 (0.152) -0.369 ** (0.141) -0.285 ** (0.104)
occupation dummies X X X
region dummies X X X
quarter dummies X X X
year dummies X X X
LR test for instruments ∼ χ2(9) 99.2 (p < 0.01)
LR test for instruments ∼ χ2(3) 13.7 (p < 0.01) 13.8 (p < 0.01) 53.6 (p < 0.01)
obs 26,005
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. The table shows estimates of the MMNL model for housing tenure estimated
jointly with the NB for search intensity. Results for the latter are shown in Table 2. Notes to that table apply here. β-s are
coeﬃcients of the index function. Robust standard errors are reported. The LR statistic tests the joint signiﬁcance of the
instrumental variables log(multifamrate), log(Cmort/Crent) and samesex.
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Table 4
Selection of the Main Method of SearchMultinomial Logit
private use ads employer friends or other
agency newspapers contact relatives
RRR s.e. RRR s.e. RRR s.e. RRR s.e. RRR s.e.
own_out 1.492 ** (0.186) 1.380 ** (0.088) 0.955 (0.097) 1.200 (0.118) 1.490 * (0.269)
own_mort 1.839 ** (0.181) 1.547 ** (0.082) 1.152 (0.094) 1.165 (0.096) 1.764 ** (0.256)
rent_soc 0.691 ** (0.073) 0.745 ** (0.032) 0.759 ** (0.051) 0.815 ** (0.057) 1.070 (0.149)
log(nummet) 1.193 ** (0.076) 1.419 ** (0.042) 1.274 ** (0.066) 1.129 ** (0.051) 0.598 ** (0.053)
white 1.394 ** (0.155) 1.640 ** (0.088) 1.285 ** (0.114) 1.345 ** (0.119) 1.773 ** (0.285)
married 0.993 (0.073) 1.252 ** (0.045) 1.209 ** (0.069) 1.044 (0.058) 1.272 * (0.127)
claimant 0.356 ** (0.026) 0.516 ** (0.020) 0.509 ** (0.029) 0.465 ** (0.027) 0.557 ** (0.057)
disabben 0.718 (0.123) 1.077 (0.070) 0.870 (0.096) 1.046 (0.104) 1.547 ** (0.221)
incsup 0.572 ** (0.099) 0.954 (0.055) 0.717 ** (0.071) 1.045 (0.089) 1.350 * (0.195)
Age
age_35_44 0.981 (0.089) 1.126 ** (0.049) 0.943 (0.063) 1.180 * (0.081) 0.809 (0.100)
age_45_54 0.966 (0.093) 1.122 * (0.052) 0.874 (0.064) 1.156 * (0.085) 0.786 (0.104)
age_55_64 0.974 (0.108) 1.159 ** (0.061) 0.822 * (0.071) 1.151 (0.096) 0.558 ** (0.090)
Highest education
degree 5.173 ** (0.740) 3.114 ** (0.237) 1.923 ** (0.222) 1.962 ** (0.220) 5.316 ** (0.945)
higher_educ 3.221 ** (0.510) 2.270 ** (0.182) 1.639 ** (0.205) 0.990 (0.133) 3.336 ** (0.668)
gce 2.030 ** (0.257) 1.708 ** (0.083) 1.556 ** (0.121) 1.235 ** (0.091) 1.820 ** (0.284)
gcse 1.385 * (0.191) 1.442 ** (0.071) 1.197 * (0.099) 0.941 (0.075) 1.608 ** (0.260)
other_qual 1.425 * (0.201) 1.264 ** (0.062) 1.347 ** (0.107) 1.059 (0.081) 1.276 (0.214)
Duration since last job
0− 3 months 5.198 ** (1.322) 0.828 ** (0.057) 1.625 ** (0.187) 1.394 ** (0.150) 0.952 (0.188)
3− 6 months 4.239 ** (1.090) 0.912 (0.063) 1.587 ** (0.186) 1.196 (0.131) 1.035 (0.209)
6− 12 months 3.302 ** (0.848) 0.869 * (0.058) 1.323 * (0.152) 1.102 (0.119) 0.795 (0.161)
1− 2 years 2.352 ** (0.604) 0.887 (0.056) 1.223 (0.137) 0.879 (0.094) 0.839 (0.166)
2− 3 years 2.031 * (0.575) 0.893 (0.067) 1.106 (0.147) 0.990 (0.119) 0.845 (0.191)
3− 4 years 1.409 (0.453) 0.838 * (0.071) 0.975 (0.150) 1.003 (0.135) 0.931 (0.223)
4− 5 years 2.190 * (0.710) 0.962 (0.090) 0.993 (0.169) 0.701 * (0.115) 1.161 (0.299)
5− 8 years 0.729 (0.249) 0.851 * (0.065) 1.049 (0.142) 0.753 * (0.096) 0.803 (0.183)
occupation dummies X
region dummies X
quarter dummies X
year dummies X
obs 26,005
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable indicates 6 categories of main search methods,
where the base category is PEC. See Appendix B for the base categories of discrete regressors. Reported coeﬃcients are
Relative Risk Ratios (RRR), which can be easily computed as RRRi1,i2,j1,j2 = exp(βi1,i2,j1,j2 ), where (i1, i2) are two
generic outcome states and (j1, j2) are two generic residential states. Deﬁning pi,j = P (main = i|HT = j,X = X¯) we
have also RRRi1,i2,j1,j2 = (pi1,j1/pi2,j1 )/(pi1,j2/pi2,j2 ). Robust standard errors are similarly transformed. The sample is
made of respondent male heads of households who are unemployed and use at least one method of search. Observations are
quarterly for the period 19992009.
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Table 5
Competing Risks Model for Unemployment Duration
risk=job risk=inactivity
RRR s.e. RRR s.e.
own_out 1.551 ** (0.075) 1.581 ** (0.072)
own_mort 1.922 ** (0.077) 1.200 ** (0.053)
rent_soc 1.345 ** (0.047) 1.446 ** (0.051)
log(nummet) 1.328 ** (0.033) 0.652 ** (0.013)
white 1.296 ** (0.056) 1.388 ** (0.060)
married 1.393 ** (0.038) 1.202 ** (0.033)
claimant 0.903 ** (0.026) 0.574 ** (0.017)
disabben 0.673 ** (0.035) 1.648 ** (0.058)
incsup 0.547 ** (0.026) 1.263 ** (0.042)
Main search method
private agency 1.297 ** (0.081) 0.843 * (0.065)
ads newspapers 1.103 ** (0.033) 1.078 ** (0.031)
employer contact 1.213 ** (0.056) 1.035 (0.053)
friends/relatives 0.937 (0.045) 1.267 ** (0.056)
other 1.439 ** (0.110) 1.113 (0.086)
Spell duration
3− 6 months 0.780 ** (0.029) 1.042 (0.046)
6− 12 months 0.637 ** (0.022) 1.056 (0.041)
1− 2 years 0.520 ** (0.018) 1.025 (0.038)
2− 3 years 0.430 ** (0.020) 1.009 (0.043)
3− over 0.403 ** (0.022) 0.986 (0.046)
Age
age_35_44 0.995 (0.034) 1.140 ** (0.044)
age_45_54 0.864 ** (0.031) 1.185 ** (0.045)
age_55_64 0.561 ** (0.023) 1.538 ** (0.061)
Highest Education
degree 1.415 ** (0.071) 1.109 * (0.056)
higher_educ 1.206 ** (0.070) 0.942 (0.055)
gce 1.371 ** (0.053) 1.108 ** (0.038)
gcse 1.290 ** (0.052) 1.026 (0.040)
other_qual 1.320 ** (0.051) 1.064 (0.038)
occupation dummies X
region dummies X
quarter dummies X
year dummies X
obs 54,995
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. The base category for the main method of search is PEC. See Appendix B for
the base categories of the other discrete regressors. Reported coeﬃcients are Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). Robust standard
errors are reported. The sample is made of unemployment spells of respondent male heads of households who use at least
one method of search. The unemployment spell can end with a job, with inactivity or be right censored.
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Figure 1
Distribution of Search Methods by Housing Tenure
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Figure 2
Distribution of Main Method of Search by Housing Tenure
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Figure 3
Selection of Main Method of Search by Housing Tenure
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Notes: Predicted probabilities are computed from estimates of the multinomial logit reported in Table 4. The quantity
reported is the probability P (main = i|HT = j,X = X¯) of selecting the main method main = i (i = 1, . . . , 6), for given
housing tenure HT = j (j = 1, . . . , 4) and with regressors evaluated at sample means.
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Appendix
A Proofs of theoretical propositions
We report below proofs of the propositions stated in Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) s∗l > s
∗
r. To prove this we calculate the derivative of s
∗
l with respect to m by means
of the implicit function theorem. At ﬁrst, we need to calculate dw∗l /dsl and dw
∗
l /dm and
evaluate these functions at the optimum.
Diﬀerentiating Equation (7) with respect to w∗l and sl we obtain
dw∗l
dsl
=
ρ−1α′(sl)
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw − c′(sl)
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
. (12)
It can be easily shown that this derivative is zero for sl = s
∗
l , since the numerator is zero
(as follows directly from the ﬁrst order condition for s∗l ). Moreover, dw
∗
l /dsl > (<)0 if
sl < (>)s
∗
l . Diﬀerentiating Equation (7) with respect to w
∗
l and m we obtain
dw∗l
dm
= − α(sn)[1− F (w
∗
l + ρm)]
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
< 0. (13)
This derivative is negative for any value of sl. Intuitively, as the moving cost increases, the
reservation wage in the local labour market for the homeowner drops since the acceptance
of a job far from home comes with a lower expected surplus. We rewrite now the ﬁrst
order condition for s∗l as
Φ(s∗l ,m) = c
′(s∗l )−
α′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l (s
∗
l ,m)
[w − w∗l (s∗l ,m)]F ′(w)dw = 0. (14)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have29
ds∗l
dm
= −Φm
Φs∗l
= −
ρ−1α′(s∗l )
∫
w∗l
(
dw∗l
dm
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗l )− ρ−1α′′(s∗l )
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw
> 0. (15)
As expected, the higher the moving cost, the higher the level of search eﬀort of the home-
owner in the local labour market. Since the relation between s∗l and m is positive for
any value of m, this will be true in particular when m = 0, that is, when the optimal
search locally (and non-locally) is s∗r = s
∗
l . Thus, when m increases from zero to a positive
number, which captures a shift from tenant to owner status, the unemployed will increase
their search eﬀort in the local labour market from s∗r to s
∗
l .
29When computing Φs∗l , we remark that
Φs∗l = c
′′(s∗l )−
α′′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw +
α′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(
dw∗l
dsl
)
F ′(w)dw =
= c′′(s∗l )−
α′′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw > 0,
where the simpliﬁcation is allowed given that dw∗l /dsl = 0 when sl = s
∗
l . This derivative is clearly positive
since c′′ > 0, α′′ < 0, and F ′ > 0. Also, Φm is negative since α′ > 0, F ′ > 0, and dw∗l /dm < 0.
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(b) s∗n < s
∗
r. As in the previous case, we calculate the derivatives dw
∗
n/dsn and dw
∗
n/dm
and we study the sign of ds∗n/dm. Diﬀerentiating the Equation w
∗
n = w
∗
l +ρm with respect
to w∗n and sn we obtain
dw∗n
dsn
=
ρ−1α′(sn)
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n)F ′(w)dw − c′(sn)
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
. (16)
Given the ﬁrst order condition for s∗n, this derivative is zero when sn = s
∗
n. Moreover,
dw∗n/dsn > (<)0 if sn < (>)s
∗
n. Diﬀerentiating with respect to w
∗
n and m we obtain
dw∗n
dm
=
ρ+ α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )]
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
> 0. (17)
This derivative is positive for any value of sn. A rise in the moving cost requires a higher
wage to induce the homeowner to move for a job. We rewrite the ﬁrst order condition for
s∗n as
Ψ(s∗n,m) = c
′(s∗n)−
α′(s∗n)
ρ
∫
w∗n(s∗n,m)
[w − w∗n(s∗n,m)]F ′(w)dw = 0. (18)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have30
ds∗n
dm
= −Ψm
Ψs∗n
= −
ρ−1α′(s∗n)
∫
w∗n
(
dw∗n
dm
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗n)− ρ−1α′′(s∗n)
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n)F ′(w)dw
< 0. (19)
The derivative of s∗n with respect to m is negative for any value of m, thus, when m
increases from zero to a positive number the unemployed will reduce their level of search
eﬀort in the non-local labour market from s∗r to s
∗
n.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We only need to look at the ﬁrst order conditions (4), (5), (8), and (9), and to use the
result of Proposition 1 and that c′(·)/α′(·) is an increasing function.
w∗l < w
∗
r ←→ B > A←→
c′(s∗l )
α′(s∗l )
>
c′(s∗r)
α′(s∗r)
←→ s∗l > s∗r,
w∗n > w
∗
r ←→ C < A←→
c′(s∗n)
α′(s∗n)
<
c′(s∗r)
α′(s∗r)
←→ s∗n < s∗r.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Since we cannot derive a closed form for the optimal search levels, the mechanism of the
demonstration is to study the derivatives of s∗l and s
∗
n with respect to m evaluated at
m = 0. In fact, when m = 0, the optimal search is identical in both the local and non-
local markets, so by deriving the optimal search levels with respect to m we can compare
the magnitude of the (opposite) marginal variations, which can be interpreted simply as
marginal diﬀerences in each market's search levels between homeowner and renter. Then
we just need to show that the magnitude of the marginal decrease in the non-local search
is higher, in absolute terms, than the marginal increase in the local search. Let's look
at Equations (15) and (19), which represent the marginal variations of, respectively, the
homeowner's local and non-local search. When m = 0, we have s∗l = s
∗
r = s
∗
n, and thus
30In the computation of Ψs∗n we make use of the fact that dw
∗
n/dsn = 0 when sn = s
∗
n. The sign of Ψm
is positive since dw∗n/dm > 0.
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the two derivatives are identical expect for the derivatives of the reservation wage in the
numerator, which have opposite signs:
ds∗l
dm
(m = 0) = −
ρ−1α′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(
dw∗l
dm
(m = 0)
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r)− ρ−1α′′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r)F ′(w)dw
, (20)
ds∗n
dm
(m = 0) = −
ρ−1α′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(
dw∗n
dm
(m = 0)
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r)− ρ−1α′′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r)F ′(w)dw
. (21)
Making use of Equations (13) and (17), we can evaluate the derivatives of the reservation
wages at the optimal values of search when m = 0:
dw∗l
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) = −
α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r ]
1 + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)] + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
, (22)
dw∗n
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) =
ρ+ α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
1 + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)] + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
. (23)
It is easy to show that ρ > 0 implies dw
∗
n
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) > |dw
∗
l
dm
(s∗r,m = 0)|, which in turn
implies |ds∗n
dm
(m = 0)| > ds∗l
dm
(m = 0). This means that the diﬀerence in the non-local search
between homeowner and renter is higher, in absolute value, than the diﬀerence in the local
search, that is s∗r − s∗n > s∗l − s∗r, which, upone rearranging, is identical to the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof : We just need to prove that the derivative of (hl + hn) with respect to m at
the optimal values of search when m = 0 is negative. Putting
dw∗l
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) = L
w,
dw∗n
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) = N
w,
ds∗l
dm
(m = 0) = Ls, and ds
∗
n
dm
(m = 0) = N s, we have
d(hl + hn)
dm
(s∗r,m = 0) = α
′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)]Ls − α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)Lw+
+ α′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)]N s − α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)Nw =
= α′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)] (Ls +N s)− α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)(Lw +Nw) < 0,
(24)
where the latter inequality holds since (Ls+N s) < 0 and (Lw+Nw) > 0, which are results
of Proposition 3.
B Description of Variables
Housing Tenure
Housing tenure related questions refer to the household. Then the outcome of the
household is imputed to all individuals belonging to it at the date of the interview.
own_out : accommodation owned outright.
own_mort : accommodation owned with mortgage.
rent_soc: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Housing Associations.
rent_pri : accommodation rented from private.
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nummet
This variable is the count of search methods used by unemployed people. People
who state they have been looking for work in the last four weeks are asked to reply
whether or not they use a speciﬁc search method for each of 14. The variable
nummet is just the sum of positive answers. The unemployed can look for work as
employee, as self-employed, or for both. In our estimation sample, we drop those
individuals who search only as self-employed. The search methods are the following:
(1) visiting a Jobcentre, (2) visiting a Careers Oﬃce, (3) visiting a Jobclub, (4)
having owns name on the books of a private employment agency, (5) advertising
for jobs in newspapers or journals, (6) answering advertisements in newspapers and
journals, (7) study vacant situations in newspapers or journals, (8) apply directly
to employers, (9) ask friends, relatives, colleagues, or trade unions about jobs, (10)
waiting for the results of job application, (11) looking for premises or equipment,
(12) seeking any kind of permit, (13) trying to get a loan or other ﬁnancial backing
for a job or business, (14) doing anything else to ﬁnd work.
Main method of search
Each individual is asked to report the main method of search used among those
described above. We operate the following grouping taking also into account that
some categories have very few observations.
pec: (1)+(2)+(3).
private employment agency : (4).
use ads newspapers : (5)+(6)+(7).
direct approach employer : (8)+(10).
ask friends relatives : (9).
other : (11)+(12)+(13)+(14).
white
Race dummy.
married
Whether legally married (not separated), regardless of living in the same household.
claimant
Whether claiming the unemployment beneﬁt, i.e. the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA).
disabben
Whether on sickness or disability beneﬁt.
incsup
Whether claiming income support not related to unemployment.
Age
Omitted category in regressions is 1634 years.
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Highest education
Education dummies refer to the highest education level attained. (1) Degree or
equivalent (2) higher education, (3) GCE, A-level or equivalent, (4) GCSE grades
A*-C or equivalent, (5) other qualiﬁcations, (6) no qualiﬁcation. The base category
in the regressions is no qualiﬁcation.
Duration since last job
(1) Less than three months, (2) three months but less than six, (3) six months but
less than 12, (4) one year but less than two, (5) two years but less than three, (6)
three years but less than four, (7) four years but less than ﬁve, (8) ﬁve years or more,
(9) more than eight years ago. The category (9) is omitted in regressions.
Occupation in last job
(1) Managers and administrators, (2) professional occupations, (3) associate profes-
sional and technical occupations, (4) clerical or secretarial occupations, (5) craft and
related occupations, (6) plant and machine operatives, (7) other occupations.
Region dummies
(1) Tyne and Wear, (2) Rest of North East, (3) Greater Manchester, (4) Merseyside,
(5) Rest of North West, (6) South Yorkshire, (7) West Yorkshire, (8) Rest of York-
shire and the Humberside, (9) East Midlands, (10) West Midlands and Metropolitan
County, (11) Rest of West Midlands, (12) Eastern, (13) Inner London, (14) Outer
London, (15) South East, (16) South West, (17) Wales, (18) Strathclyde, (19) Rest
of Scotland, (20) Northern Ireland.
Quarter dummies
qrtr1 (January-March), qrtr2 (April-June), qrtr3 (July-September), qrtr4 (October-
December).
Year dummies
Our sample spans the period 19992009 for a total of 11 years and 44 quarters of
observations.
log(multifamrate)
The variable multifamrate indicates the percentage of households living in multi-
family housing for each region and quarter.
log(Cmort/Crent)
The variables Cmort and Crent capture average housing costs for mortgagers and
renters at regional and quarter level. Data on housing costs are retrieved from the
UK Family Resource Survey (FRS). For mortgagers, we consider the total weekly
mortgage costs including mortgage payments, endowment policies, structural insur-
ance and service payments. For renters, we consider the total weekly rent pay-
ment comprehensive of service charges. These variables are expressed in real weekly
pounds of 2010q2 and are weighted with household sampling weights. In the FRS
around 25,000 households are surveyed for each year using a stratiﬁed random sam-
ple. The primary sampling unit (PSU) is the postcode sector. For each year, the
PSUs are systematically allocated to quarters to ensure that the sample is balanced
on a quarterly basis.
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samesex
This is a dummy indicating whether the two ﬁrst-born children in the household are
the same sex.
C The Endogenous Multinomial Treatment Eﬀect
We give a formal description of the methodology used to estimate the eﬀect of housing
tenure on search intensity, whose results are reported in Table 2 (Deb & Trivedi, 2006b,a).
In this model, the housing tenure is determined jointly with the search methods count
equation. The speciﬁcation is consistent with selection on unobserved heterogeneity.
Each individual i chooses a residential status j from a set of four choices (j = 0, 1, 2, 3),
where j = 0 is the control group (private renters). Let dj be binary selection variables
representing the observed tenure choice and di = (di1, di2, di3). Also let li = (li1, li2, li3),
where lij are latent factors which incorporate unobserved characteristics common to indi-
vidual i 's status choice and outcome. Then the probability function for the tenure choice
is endogenously modeled by a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) structure:
P (di|zi, li) = exp(z
′
iαj + δjlij)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(z
′
iαk + δklik)
, (25)
where zi denotes a set of exogenous regressors and J = 3. The estimates for this model
are shown in Table 3.31
The equation for the expected count outcome is
E(yi|di,xi, li) = exp(x′iβ +
J∑
j=1
γjdij +
J∑
j=1
λjlij), (26)
where xi is a set of exogenous variables within zi and the γj-s are the treatment coeﬃcients
relative to private renters. Latent factors enter into the outcome equation as in the treat-
ments equations, so the expected count is a function of unobserved characteristics which
aﬀect the selection into housing tenure as well. When the factor loading parameter λi in
Equation (26) is positive (negative), unobserved factors which increase the probability of
selecting the j-th residential status also increase (reduce) the number of search methods,
i.e., there is positive (negative) selection. The distribution of yi is assumed to follow a
negative binomial process:
f(yi|di,xi, li) = Γ(yi + ψ)
Γ(ψ)Γ(yi + 1)
(
ψ
µi + ψ
)ψ (
µi
µi + ψ
)yi
, (27)
where µi = E(yi|di,xi, li) = exp(x′iβ + d′iγ + l′iλ) and ψ incorporates the overdispersion
parameter (and may vary with i). The negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson
distribution, as it takes into account an overdispersion of counts, which occurs when the
count variance is larger than the mean. In the general class of negative binomial models,
the variance is modeled by a function of the mean µi and of the overdispersion parameter
α: V [yi|xi] = µi + αµpi (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). For p = 1 and p = 2, we have the
two most known densities: the negative binomial of the ﬁrst (NB1) and of the second
31As in the standard multinomial logit model, the parameters in the MMNL are identiﬁed only up to
a scale, hence a scale normalization for the latent factors is required. For that, we can simply set δj = 1
for each j.
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kind (NB2), for which the variance is either proportional or quadratic in the mean. For
α = 0, the negative binomial reduces to the Poisson. The null hypothesis of equidispersion,
H0 : α = 0, can be tested against the alternative of overdispersion, α > 0, by performing
a Wald test on the estimated α (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Equation (27) is the density
of the NB1 for ψ = α−1 and of the NB2 for ψ = α−1µi.
The joint distribution of the treatment and outcome variables is
Pr(yi,di|xi, zi, li) = f(yi|di,xi, li)× Pr(di|zi, li) =
= f(x′iβ + d
′
iγ + l
′
iλ)× g(z′iα1 + δ1li1, . . . , z′iαJ + δJ liJ).
(28)
Some diﬃculties in the estimation of the maximum likelihood arise, since the lij are un-
known. The method to be used will consist of assuming that the lij are i.i.d draws from
the standard normal distribution, so that their joint distribution h can be integrated out
of Equation (28). Moreover, as the model does not have a closed form log-likelihood, the
estimation will be carried out using numerical integration and simulation-based methods.32
Equation (28) can be rewritten as
Pr(yi,di|xi, zi) =
∫
[f(x′iβ + d
′
iγ + l
′
iλ)× g(z′iα1 + δ1li1, . . . , z′iαJ + δJ liJ)]h(li)dli
≈ 1
S
S∑
s=1
[
f(x′iβ + d
′
iγ + l¯
′
isλ)× g(z′iα1 + δ1l˜i1s, . . . , z′iαJ + δJ l˜iJs)
]
,
(29)
where l¯is is the s-th random draw from the distribution h out of a total S. The simulated
log-likelihood can be written as
lnL(yi,di|xi, zi) =
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1
S
S∑
s=1
[
f(x′iβ + d
′
iγ + l¯
′
isλ)
× g(z′iα1 + δ1l˜i1s, . . . , z′iαJ + δJ l˜iJs)
])
.
(30)
Maximizing the simulated log-likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood
provided S is suﬃciently large. We set S = 2, 000. The parameters of this model are
identiﬁed through nonlinearities even if all regressors in the outcome equations are included
in the treatment equations, i.e., zi = xi. However exclusion restrictions are recommended
for more robust identiﬁcation (Deb & Trivedi, 2006b,a)
32In order to economize on computing time, the routine uses quasi-random draws based on Halton
sequences instead of standard methods based on pseudo-random draws. The former have been proved
to be more eﬀective for maximum simulated estimation: they can provide the same accuracy with fewer
draws (Bhat, 2001; Train, 2003).
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